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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 2003, twenty-four-year-old Los Angeles Lakers star Kobe Bryant
was charged with the sexual assault of a nineteen-year-old hotel concierge.1 Under a
gag order, both Bryant and his accuser declined to discuss the facts of the case.2
However, sources close to Bryant disclosed one side of the story.3 According to
these sources, the accuser initially consented to sexual intercourse.4 During sexual
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http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/07/18/kobe.bryant/index.html.
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Allison Samuels, Kobe Off the Court, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 2003, at 51.
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Id. at 52.
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intercourse, Bryant expressed concern that he was not using a condom.5 Shortly
thereafter, the accuser expressed her desire to cease sexual intercourse.6 On
September 1, 2004, less then one week before opening statements were slated to
begin, charges against Bryant were dismissed with prejudice.7 Had the charges not
been dropped, Bryant’s future may have hinged on a single question: Does a
revocation of consent during sexual intercourse nullify prior consent?
Approximately one week after the charges against Bryant were filed, Illinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich signed Senate Bill 406 into law.8 Pursuant to Senate Bill
406, “[a] person who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not
deemed to have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs
after he or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual penetration or
sexual conduct.”9 Senate Bill 406 effectively recognizes the right of a person to
withdraw consent at any point after the commencement of sexual intercourse.10 In
accordance with Senate Bill 406, a person may be charged with rape despite initial
consent on the part of his or her sexual partner.11
Since its inception, Senate Bill 406 has been the subject of national debate. In
enacting Senate Bill 406, Illinois became the first state to formally recognize the
crime of “initial consent” rape in its statutory code.12 Moreover, Senate Bill 406 has
obvious implications in the outcome of cases with similar fact situations to that of
the prosecution of Kobe Bryant.
First, this Note will examine the impetus behind the introduction of Senate Bill
406. Second, this Note will examine the legal effect of Senate Bill 406 on Illinois’
sexual assault laws. Third, this Note will address problems with the statutory
recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape. Fourth, this Note will address
problems with the crime of “initial consent” rape within the context of the Illinois
statutory code. Fifth, this Note will examine the effects of rape on the victim. Sixth,

5

Id. at 52-53.

6

Id. at 53.

7
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http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/01/bryant.trial/index.html.

1,

2004),

at

8

Associated Press, New Rape Law Protects People Who Change Mind During Sex (July
29, 2003), at http://www.highbeam.com/library/doco.asp?docid=1G1:10860%947&teaser=
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
9

S.B. 406, 93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003).

10

The Leader-Chicago Bureau, Illinois’ New Rape Law Raises National Discussion (Aug.
1, 2003), at http://www.illinoisleader.com/news/newsview.asp?c=7446.
11

Adriana Colindres, Blagojevich Vetoes New Rules on State Lease Arrangements, THE
STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), July 29, 2003, at 12. Senate Bill 406 is gender
neutral. See The Leader-Chicago Bureau, supra note 10. However, in the majority of rape
cases, the assailant will be male and the victim will be female. Studies indicate that male rape
constitutes only 5 to 10 percent of all reported rapes. MARY E. WILLIAMS, RAPE 44
(Greenhaven Press 2001). For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that the assailant
is male and that the victim is female. Pronouns will be used accordingly.
12

The Leader-Chicago Bureau, supra note 10.
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this Note will discuss potential solutions to the problems of Illinois’ amended rape
law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origin of Illinois Senate Bill 406
Senate Bill 406 was inspired by In re John Z.,13 a recent California Supreme
Court case.14 In re John Z. involved the alleged rape of a seventeen-year old
female.15 According to the facts of the case, the victim and the defendant were alone
in the defendant’s parents’ bedroom. Prior to sexual intercourse, the victim and the
defendant engaged in sexual activity that was, for the sake of argument, consensual.
At one point, the victim was sitting on the edge of the bed with her clothing strewn
across the room. The defendant rolled the victim over so that she was lying on her
back. Once she was on her back, the defendant began kissing the victim and telling
her that she had “a really beautiful body.” The victim said nothing in response to the
defendant’s conduct. The defendant then proceeded to achieve sexual penetration.
The victim testified that after the commencement of sexual intercourse, “she kept
like trying to pull away.” She further testified that she informed the defendant that
she did not want to engage in sexual intercourse at that time and that she needed to
go home. Despite the victim’s claimed resistance, the defendant continued to engage
in sexual intercourse.16 The juvenile court found the defendant guilty of forcible
rape.17 The California Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in
appellate court decisions as to whether or not a person had the right to revoke
consent following the commencement of sexual intercourse.18
The California court system first addressed the concept of a right to revoke
consent during sexual intercourse in the 1985 case of People v. Vela.19 Vela
involved the alleged rape of a fourteen-year old female by a nineteen-year old male.20
The evidence presented at trial was such that a juror could reasonably find that the
victim initially consented to the sexual intercourse at issue; that the victim revoked
her consent during the act of sexual intercourse; and that the defendant continued to
engage in sexual intercourse following the victim’s revocation of consent.21 During
the deliberation phase of the trial, the jury posed the following question to the trial
court: “Once penetration has occurred with the female’s consent, if the female

13

60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003).

14

Matt Bean, Saying Yes, then No: Bryant Case Enters National Debate (Aug. 6, 2003), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/05/ctv.bryant.law/index.html.
15

In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184.

16

Id. at 184-85.

17

Id. at 184.

18

Id.

19

172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

20

Id. at 239.

21

Id. at 240.
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changes her mind does force from that point constitute rape?”22 The trial court
informed the jury that it did not possess an answer to the question.23 The jury
subsequently found the defendant guilty of rape.24
On review, the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District sought
to determine an answer to the jury’s question.25 In attempting to determine an
answer to the jury’s question, the court of appeals looked to the essence of the crime
of rape.26 It identified the essence of the crime of rape as “the outrage to the person
and feelings of the female resulting from the nonconsensual violation of her
womanhood.”27 The court of appeals concluded that a victim who initially consented
to sexual intercourse and later revoked consent during the act of sexual intercourse
could not experience the same magnitude of outrage as a victim who resisted sexual
intercourse from the outset.28 As a result, the court of appeals held that the crime of
rape could not occur in a scenario in which a woman initially consented to sexual
intercourse and then later revoked her consent during the act of sexual intercourse.29
The court of appeals did caution, however, that a person who persisted in sexual
intercourse following a revocation of consent could be subject to other criminal
charges, namely assault and battery.30 Refusing to recognize the right to revoke

22

Id.

23

Id. The trial court initially answered in the jury’s question in the affirmative. Id. After
further consideration, the trial court advised the jury: “The note that you gave us yesterday,
quite frankly, is something that took us a while to check on. And to be candid with you, we do
not have a definitive answer to the question.” Id.
24

Id.

25

Id. at 241. The court of appeals explained that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury on general principles of the law. Id. The court of appeals further explained
that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to reinstruct the jury on a principle of law if it was
apparent that the jury was confused as to the principle of law. Id. The court of appeals
concluded that the trial court committed error by failing to answer the jury’s question. Id.
The court of appeals explained that whether or not this error was prejudicial, warranting the
reversal of the trial court judgment, depended on whether or not the answer to the juries
question was “yes” or “no.” Id.
26

Id. at 243.

27

Id.

28

Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the Vela court consulted the case law of other
jurisdictions. See id. More specifically, the Vela court cited a Maryland case and a North
Carolina case. See id. In Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (Md. 1980), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that a woman could withdraw consent up until the point of
penetration, but not thereafter. According to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, if the woman
withdrew consent following penetration, there could be no rape. Id. Likewise, in State v.
Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1979), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that rape
could not occur in a situation in which “actual penetration was accomplished with the
woman’s consent.” Both of the cases focused on the presence or absence of consent at the
point of penetration.
29

Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 241.

30

Id.
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consent during sexual intercourse, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
judgment.31
Nearly a decade and a half after Vela was decided, questions as to the right to
revoke consent during sexual intercourse resurfaced in the California court system.
People v. Roundtree involved the alleged rape of a fifteen-year old female by a
thirty-nine year old male.32 The victim ran away from a group home in an effort to
locate her mother. Along the way, the victim crossed paths with the defendant,
whom offered to assist her in her endeavors. The defendant drove the victim to an
apartment complex that he supposedly lived in with his sister. The defendant
informed the victim that they could not enter the apartment because his sister was
asleep and then suggested that they take a nap in the car. At this point in the fact
pattern, the victim’s and the defendant’s stories diverged. The victim testified that
the defendant raped her after she insisted that they resume the search for her mother.
The defendant testified that the victim initially consented to the sexual intercourse at
issue. The defendant further testified that during sexual intercourse, the victim told
him to stop because she thought she heard someone approaching the car.33 During
the deliberation phase of the trial, the jury posed the following question to the trial
court: “If, after penetration, the female changes her mind and says ‘stop’ and the
male continues, is this still rape?”34 The trial court responded by saying, “…the fact
that there was a prior penetration with the consent of the female [did] not negate
rape.”35 The jury found the defendant guilty of rape.36
On review, the California Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District sought
to determine whether or not the trial court correctly instructed the jury.37 In
attempting to do so, it consulted the Vela decision. The court of appeals
characterized the Vela decision as being unsound.38 It criticized the Vela court for
failing to apply the statutory definition of rape to the fact pattern presented.39 The
court of appeals explained that when the statutory elements of the crime of rape are
satisfied, “the outrage to the victim is complete.”40 The statutory code defined rape
as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished … against a person’s will by means of
force.”41 After considering the statutory definition of rape, the court of appeals
concluded that rape could occur in a scenario in which a woman initially consented
to sexual intercourse and later revoked her consent during the act of sexual
31

Id. at 244.

32

People v. Roundtree, 77 Cal. App. 4th 846, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).

33

Id. at 847-49.

34

Id. at 850.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 847.

37

Id. at 849. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in issuing its
jury instructions. Id.
38

Id. at 851.

39

Id. at 852.

40

Id.

41

Id.
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intercourse.42 Recognizing the right to revoke consent during sexual intercourse, the
court of appeals held that the jury instructions were appropriate and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.43
In In re John Z., the Supreme Court of California adopted the thinking of the
Roundtree court. The supreme court noted that there were no means of accurately
measuring the level of outrage suffered by a person.44 In doing so, the supreme court
attacked the assumption that the victim who consents to sexual intercourse and
revokes consent during sexual intercourse does not experience the same magnitude
of outrage as the victim who resists sexual intercourse from the outset.45 The
supreme court further noted that outrage to the person was not an element of the
crime of rape.46 The supreme court held that “a withdrawal of consent effectively
nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he
persists in … nonconsensual intercourse.”47
The California court system spent three years trying to clarify the definition of
sexual assault.48 Approximately six weeks after the Supreme Court of California
decided In re John Z., Illinois lawmakers introduced Senate Bill 406. At the time,
42

Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the Roundtree court, like the Vela court, consulted the
case law of other jurisdictions. See id. The Roundtree court noted that several states had
rejected the Vela court’s reasoning. Id. In State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 962 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1994), the Appellate Court of Connecticut was asked to interpret the word “intercourse” as
it appeared in the state’s sexual assault laws. The appellant contended that the word
referenced only initial penetration. Id. If this were the case, rape could not occur in a
situation in which initial penetration was accomplished with consent. Id. The Appellate Court
of Connecticut interpreted the word “intercourse” to include both initial intercourse and
continued intercourse. Id. The court held that continued penetration accomplished in the
absence of consent and through the application of force constituted rape. Id. at 963. In
rendering its decision, the court stated, “it is a basic principle of law that common sense is not
left at the courtroom door. Similarly, in State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. 1995),
the Court of Appeals of Minnesota explained that the state’s sexual assault laws “provide[d] a
broader reference point than the moment of slightest intrusion.” Id. The court held that “rape
include[d] forcible continuance of initially-consensual sexual relations.” Id.
43

Roundtree, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 852.

44

In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 186.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 184. The Supreme Court of California upheld the defendant’s conviction. Id.
Justice Brown dissented. Id. at 188. Brown acknowledged the right of a woman to revoke
consent during sexual intercourse. Id. Brown criticized the majority for failing to consider
whether or not the victim’s statements amounted to a revocation of consent. Id. He noted that
a reasonable mistake as to the issue of consent was a defense to rape. Id. He further noted
that “initial consent” rape cases were likely to involve credibility contests. Id. Brown also
criticized the majority for failing to establish more explicit guidelines for future cases. Id.
The majority did not set a time period in which a person had to cease sexual intercourse
following a revocation of consent. Id. at 190. The majority also did not state whether or not
persistence constituted force. Id.
48

Robert Baxter, Law Re-Examines Consensual Sex, ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR, July 18,
2003, at 11A.
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Illinois’ sexual assault law strongly resembled California’s sexual assault law.49
Proponents of Senate Bill 406 characterized the legislation as a preventative measure
against judicial controversy.50 Senator Dan Rutherford, a cosponsor of Senate Bill
406, explained, “with Illinois and California’s laws being very similar, we wanted to
craft a bill that would prevent us from going down the same path in Illinois that
California did.”51
B. Effect of Senate Bill 406 on Illinois’ Sexual Assault Laws
The Illinois statutory code defines criminal sexual assault as “an act of sexual
penetration by the use of or threat of force.”52 Pursuant to this definition, the crime
of sexual assault possesses two actus reus elements: sexual penetration and either the
use of force or the threat of the use of force. The Illinois statutory code defines
sexual penetration as “any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of
one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any
intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person, into the sex organ or
anus of another person ….”53 This definition does not limit sexual penetration to the
act of initial intrusion. The definition of sexual penetration can be read to include
both the act of initial intrusion and the act of sexual intercourse. The Illinois
statutory code provides that the force element of criminal sexual assault can be
satisfied in one of two situations.54 The first situation occurs “when the accused
threatens to use force or violence on the victim or on any other person, and the
victim under the circumstances reasonably believe[s] that the accused ha[s] the
ability to execute the threat.”55 The second situation occurs “when the accused
overcome[s] the victim by use of superior strength or size, physical restraint or
physical confinement.”56 The preceding statutory language does not deprive a person
of the right to revoke consent during the act of sexual intercourse. Theoretically, a
person could have been charged with the crime of “initial consent” rape before the
enactment of Senate Bill 406.
Senate Bill 406 does not change the definition of sexual assault within the state
of Illinois; Senate Bill 406 merely clarifies the definition of sexual assault within the
state of Illinois.57 Senator Dan Rutherford stated that “the goal [of Senate Bill 406]
was not to change Illinois law as it pertains to sexual assault, but more simply to
49

See id.

50
Associated Press, New Illinois Rape Law Protects People Who Change Mind During
Sex, available at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,93245,00.html (July 29, 2003) [hereinafter
Associated Press].
51

Baxter, supra note 48.

52

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(1) (1998).

53

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(f) (1998).

54

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(d) (1998).

55

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(d)(1) (1998).

56

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(d)(2) (1998).

57

Laura Jastram, Bill Ensures “No Means No” in Illinois, DAILY ILLINI (Champaign, Ill.),
July 30, 2003, at 1.
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clarify what most people believe the law says.”58 According to Rutherford, Illinois
lawmakers wanted to clarify once and for all that “no meant no.”59 In reaction to the
enactment of Senate Bill 406, Ross Wantland, coordinator of the sexual assault
education program at the University of Illinois, stated, “no always meant no.”60 She
further stated that from a legal perspective, Senate Bill 406 contributed little to
Illinois’ sexual assault law.61 When asked about Senate Bill 406, Robert Shapiro, a
defense attorney in the O.J. Simpson case, responded by saying that the legislation
was likely to be unnecessary.62
III. ANALYSIS
A. Inherent Problems in Recognizing the Crime of “Initial Consent” Rape
1. Limitations on Evidence
In “initial consent” rape cases, prosecutors will have trouble amassing the
evidence necessary to prosecute alleged assailants. Given the nature of the crime,
evidence will be limited. For example, prosecutors typically will not have access to
eyewitnesses. In an “initial consent” rape case, the sexual intercourse at issue is
initially consensual. Consensual sexual intercourse often occurs in a private
environment.63 As a result, a third party is not likely to witness the crime.
Prosecutors have traditionally relied on the results of medical examinations in
prosecuting rape claims.64 Following incidents of rape, victims may seek medical
attention.65 Most hospitals follow a similar protocol for treating rape victims,
namely the rape kit.66 A rape kit includes the instructions and materials necessary to
collect and preserve forensic evidence of rape.67 During a rape kit examination,
medical personnel perform a very methodical procedure.68 This procedure is aimed

58

Colindres, supra note 11.

59

Jastram, supra note 57.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

The Leader-Chicago Bureau, supra note 10. Wendy Murphy, director of the Victim
Advocacy and Research Group in Boston, adopted a similar attitude. See Associated Press,
supra note 50. In reaction to Illinois’ amended rape law, Murphy issued the following
statement: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. I don’t think that it was broke.” Id.
63
See Wendy McElroy, Law Needs New Category of Sexual
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,95069,00.html (Aug. 19, 2003).

Assault,

at

64

See JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD
CRIME 222 (1993).
65

See id.

66

Gathering Medical Evidence: What will Happen to Me in the Hospital?, at
http://www.nd.edu/~ucc/ucc_sexualvictimhospital.html (last modified Feb. 20, 2004).
67

ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 226.

68

Id. at 227.
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towards the recovery of foreign fluid, foreign hair, and foreign tissue from the body
of the victim.69
Prosecutors use the rape kit to establish the identity of the assailant and the act of
sexual intercourse. For obvious reasons, the rape kit has little, if any, evidentiary
value in an “initial consent” rape case. In an “initial consent” rape case, the primary
issue is the withdrawal of consent. The identity of the assailant and the act of sexual
intercourse will have already been established.
In the course of performing a rape kit examination, medical personnel will
examine the victim’s body for external physical injury.70 Bruises and abrasions are
indicative of resistance on the part of the victim. Such marks will tend to prove a
withdrawal of consent.
Unfortunately, bruises and abrasions will not be
commonplace in an “initial consent” rape case. The victim will withdraw consent
while engaged in sexual intercourse with the assailant. Presumably, the assailant
will be in position to combat resistance without inflicting significant bodily injury.
In approximately two-thirds of all reported rape cases, the victim exhibits no
external physical injury.71 This statistic has led to the increased use of the
colposcope in rape cases.72 The colposcope is a “microscope on wheels” that enables
physicians to examine the female reproductive track at a magnification of up to
fifteen times.73 With the colposcope, physicians are able to identify subtle changes
in the female reproductive track.74
Laura Slaughter, medical director of the Suspected Abuse Response Team for
San Luis Obispo County, California, has conducted extensive research on the
application of colposcopy to rape cases.75 In a 1993 study, Slaughter compared
colposcope photographs taken from rape victims with colposcope photographs taken
from women who engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.76 Slaughter found
evidence of genital trauma in 89 percent of the rape victims and only 15 percent of
the women who engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.77

69

See JOHN M. MACDONALD, RAPE: CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 146 (1995); see also ALLISON
& WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 228 (providing rape kit instructions for a crime lab in
Missouri).
70

See ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 227.

71

ROB HALL, RAPE IN AMERICA 105 (1995).

72

See id. The colposcope was originally used as a diagnostic test for uterine cancer. Id.

73

Id.

74

Kristen Wood, Instrument Used to Detect Rape Evidence (Sept. 29, 2000), available at
www.localnews8.com/stories/september2000/29/rapeinstr.htm.
75

HALL, supra note 71, at 106.

76

Id.

77

Id. The mean number of injury sites on women who sustained genital trauma through
consensual sexual intercourse was one. Id. In contrast, the mean number of injury sites on
women who sustained genital trauma through rape was three. Id. Slaughter attributed
differences in the degree of genital trauma to the position of the pelvis during sexual
intercourse. Id.
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In an earlier study, Slaughter attempted to identify the types of internal injuries
detected through colposcopy.78 Slaughter found that the internal injuries most
frequently detected occurred at the point of initial contact between the penis and the
vagina.79 She described these injuries as “mounting injuries.”80 In an “initial
consent” rape case, a victim will unlikely sustain “mounting injuries” because sexual
penetration is consensual. Thus, the colposcope, much like the rape kit, will be of
diminished evidentiary value.
Prosecutors have been known to employ the use of the polygraph in rape cases
lacking eyewitnesses and physical evidence.81 The polygraph is an instrument that
monitors an individual’s autonomic nervous system responses.82 Theoretically, when
an individual lies, there will be notable deviations in his or her blood pressure, pulse
rate, respiration rate, and galvanic skin response.83 The key word in the preceding
sentence is “theoretically.” Polygraphs are not completely accurate.84 Polygraphs
have been known to yield false results, especially when the subject is of a nervous
disposition.85 Moreover, there are ways to defeat the polygraph.86 For example,
some subjects state a proposition over and over again until they accept its truth.87
Some categories of persons have been deemed wholly unsuitable for polygraph
testing.88 Such categories of persons include, but are not limited to, the following:
psychopathic liars, alcoholics, persons who are hungry or thirsty, persons with heart
conditions, persons with colds, and persons on medication.89 Due to concerns
surrounding the accuracy of the polygraph, some jurisdictions have restricted the use
of the polygraph and the admissibility of polygraph results in criminal trials.90
78

Id.

79

Id. The most frequent injury was tears to the posterior fourchette. Id. The second most
frequent injury was abrasions to the labia minor. Id. The third most frequent injury was
ecchymosis to the hymen. Id.
80

Id.

81

See MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 146.

82

Ben Clark, Trial by Ordeal? Polygraph Testing in Australia, 7 MURDOCK UNIV. ELEC.
JOURNAL OF LAW 1 (Mar. 2000), at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n1/
clarke71_text.html.
83

Id.

84

MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 146.

85

Clark, supra note 82.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id. at n.4.

90
Id. Illinois restricts the use of the polygraph and the admissibility of polygraph results in
criminal trials. Pursuant to the Illinois statutory code,
In the course of a criminal trial the court shall not require, request, or suggest that the
defendant submit to a polygraphic detection deception test, commonly known as a lie
detector test, to questioning under the effect of thiopental sodium, or to any other test
or questioning by means of a mechanical device or chemical substance.
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2. Potential for False Accusations and Wrongful Convictions
The unfounded rate of rape exceeds that of any other Crime Index crime.91 Many
motives underlie false reports of rape.92 Most motives fall within one of four
classifications: alibi motives, revenge motives, financial motives, or attention
motives.93 False reports of rape are detrimental because they tie up police and
judicial resources.94 Moreover, false reports of rape disrupt the lives of the defendant
and those persons close to the defendant. In the worst-case scenario, a false report
can culminate in a wrongful conviction.
On July 8, 1979, Cathleen Crowell, who at the time was sixteen years old,
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with her boyfriend.95 Shortly thereafter,
Crowell grew nervous that her boyfriend might have impregnated her.96 The
following night, she “ripped the buttons off [of her] clothing, scratched [her] body
with a piece of broken glass, made a mark around [her] vaginal area and pinched and
bruised [herself] and did other things to make it appear that [she] had been violently
attacked.”97 She then stood on the outskirts of a road near a shopping mall and
flagged down a police officer.98 With tears in her eyes, Crowell informed the officer
that three men abducted her in the shopping mall parking lot and that one of those
men violently raped her.99 The officer took Crowell to a hospital, where a rape kit
examination was performed. Later at the police station, Crowell worked with a
sketch artist, who was able to draw up a composite sketch of the fictitious
assailant.100 Unfortunately for twenty-two-year old Gary Dotson, the composite
sketch resembled him.101 With the assistance of police, Crowell identified Dotson as

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-19. Like Illinois, California also restricts the use of the polygraph
and the admissibility of polygraph results in criminal trials. California law provides that
polygraph results are inadmissible unless all parties stipulate to their admission. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 351.1 (2004).
91

HALL, supra note 71, at 16. Not all unfounded reports are false reports. Unfounded
reports are those reports that have been determined to be false or for which there is insufficient
evidence to support the offense. Id. In 1991, the unfounded rate of rape was 8 percent. Id. In
that same year, the average unfounded rate for all other Crime Index crimes was 2 percent. Id.
92

MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 87.

93

Id.

94

See id. at 85.

95

Center on Wrongful Convictions, The Rape that Wasn’t – The First DNA Exoneration in
Illinois (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/
exonerations/Dotson.htm [hereinafter Center on Wrongful Convictions].
96

Id.

97

MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 84.

98

Center on Wrongful Convictions, supra note 95.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.
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the assailant.102 Dotson was convicted of rape and sentenced to twenty-five to fifty
years in prison.103 Today, with the enactment of Feminist rape reform legislation and
with the recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape, Crowell would not have
had to have gone to such great lengths in making a false report of rape.
a. Feminist Rape Reform
In 1960, approximately 36 percent of women worked outside the home.104 Ten
years later, as the decade drew to a close, more than 50 percent of women worked
outside of the home.105 Some men resisted the integration of women into the
workplace, “view[ing] women’s newfound assertiveness and involvement in the
public sphere as an attack on traditional roles and a defiance of chivalry.”106 The
increased presence of women in the public sphere, which was accompanied by
adamant opposition from some men, increased opportunities for victimization.107 As
women gained ground in the workplace, they began to voice their dissatisfaction
with social policies that adhered to traditional gender roles.108 One area of focus was
rape law.109 “Feminists charged that the law of sex legitimated a societal order in
which the sexual abuse of women was commonplace.”110
The feminist movement is responsible for two significant rape reforms: the
elimination of the physical resistance requirement and the enactment of rape shield
laws.111 Traditionally, physical resistance was an element of the crime of rape.112
Prosecutors were required to prove that the victim physically resisted her assault.113
The victim’s physical resistance served as evidence of lack of consent.114 Feminists
102

Id.

103

Id. In 1985, Crowell retracted her rape claim. Id. By this time, Dotson had served
more than half a decade in prison. Id. The judge did not believe Crowell’s retraction. Id.
However, with public sentiment mounting, Illinois Governor James Thompson commuted
Dotson’s sentence to the time already served. Id. On August 14, 1989, DNA evidence
officially exonerated Dotson of the crime of rape. Id. Dotson became the first person in
Illinois to be exonerated of a crime through the application of DNA testing. Id.
104

CONFRONTING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 40 (Mary E. Odem & Jody Clay-Warner
eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONFRONTING].
105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 41.

110

Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 796 (1988).
111

Id. at 799.

112

Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J.
2687, 2691 (1991).
113

Id.

114

Id.
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challenged the physical resistance requirement of rape on the grounds that it
“prescribed a course of action that significantly increased [the victim’s] chances of
suffering additional physical injury.”115 Feminist pressures effected change in 1974,
as Michigan passed landmark rape reform legislation.116 The rape reform legislation
shifted the focus from the victim’s actions to the defendant’s actions.117 It phased out
the physical resistance requirement by defining the crime of rape solely in terms of
the amount of force applied by the defendant.118 Michigan’s rape reform legislation
had a domino effect. Today, a majority of states have eliminated the physical
resistance requirement.119
A majority of states have also enacted rape shield laws.120 Generally, rape shield
laws prohibit a defendant from presenting testimony as to a victim’s prior sexual
history.121 From a feminist perspective, rape shield laws serve three purposes. First,
rape shield laws “counter the assumption that a promiscuous woman [is] more likely
to consent to [sexual intercourse] than a virgin.”122 Second, rape shield laws prevent
the fact-finder from punishing the victim for what may be deemed to be an
unacceptable lifestyle.123 Third, rape shield laws protect victims from a second
victimization on the stand.124
b. “Initial Consent” Rape in Light of Feminist Rape Reform
The statutory recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape coupled with the
enactment of feminist rape reform legislation encourages false accusations of rape.
115

Chamallas, supra note 110, at 799.

116

CONFRONTING, supra note 104, at 45.

117

Chamallas, supra note 110, at 799.

118

Id.

119

Berliner, supra note 112, at 2692.

120

A M. JOHNSON & ROBERT T. SIGLER, FORCED SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IN INTIMATE
RELATIONSHIPS 23-24 (1997). By 1990, more than forty states had rape shield laws. Id.
121

ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 178-79. Rape shield laws vary from
state to state. JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 24. The most restrictive rape shield
laws are those that exclude evidence as to a victim’s sexual history with anyone but the
defendant. Id. Illinois enforces a restrictive rape shield statute. Pursuant to the Illinois rape
shield statute
[T]he prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim … is inadmissible
except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim …
with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of
whether the alleged victim … consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which
the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7. Some individuals believe that the Illinois rape shield statute is
too restrictive. These individuals have criticized the statute for failing to acknowledge certain
situations in which evidence of the victim’s sexual history might be pertinent. See
MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 176.
122

JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 23.

123

Chamallas, supra note 110, at 800.

124

See ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 178.
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There is an inherent limitation on the availability of evidence in an “initial consent”
rape case. As a result, law enforcement personnel and prosecutors will expect less
from the alleged victim in terms of evidence. Moreover, just as there is a lack of
evidence to prove an act of “initial consent” rape, there is a lack of evidence to prove
a false accusation of “initial consent” rape. At trial, the alleged victim is not required
to establish physical resistance, or the lack of consent that logically follows from
physical resistance.125 In some states, that burden now rests on the defendant.126
Furthermore, the alleged victim is protected from intrusive questions into her sexual
history.127 She is shielded from verbal abuse and harassment.128
In the wake of feminist rape reform, statutory recognition of the crime of “initial
consent” rape creates a legitimate threat of wrongful conviction. A charge of “initial
consent” rape will oftentimes entail a “he said, she said” scenario, and nothing
more.129 In the absence of physical evidence and eyewitnesses, prosecutors will be
inclined to attack the defendant’s character. As a result, the outcome of the case will
depend largely on the perceived credibility of the victim and the defendant. In a case
that boils down to a credibility contest, the defendant is at a clear disadvantage.
Rape shield laws prohibit the defendant from using the victim’s sexual history to cast
doubt on the victim’s claimed revocation of consent.130 At one time, physical
resistance served as an objective measure of consent.131 With physical resistance as
an element of rape, the issue of consent was not subject to misinterpretation by the
defendant or the jury.132 The same cannot be said today.
c. Procedural and Societal Safeguards
Admittedly, there are both procedural and societal safeguards against the threat
of wrongful conviction. For example, prosecutors tend to prosecute only those rape
cases in which there is sufficient evidence of the assailant’s guilt.133 In cases that are
125

See Berliner, supra note 112, at 2692.

126

See Chamallas, supra note 110, at 800. Illinois recognizes consent as a defense to
criminal sexual assault.
Pursuant to the Illinois statutory code, It shall be a defense to any offense under
Section 12-13 through 12-16 of this Code where force or threat of force is an element
of the offense that the victim consented. “Consent means a freely given agreement to
the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question. Lack of verbal or physical
resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force
by the accused shall not constitute consent.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17.
127

ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 178.

128

Id. Some individuals view the enforcement of rape shield statutes as a violation of the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
129

See McElroy, supra note 63.

130

JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 23.

131

Berliner, supra note 112, at 2696.

132

Id.

133

See HALL, supra note 71, at 22. In 1988, there were approximately 15,562 rape
convictions in the United States. Id. Of those convictions, 77 percent resulted from a guilty
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prosecuted, jurors tend to be skeptical of alleged victims.134 Rape myths are
“prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists.”135
One of the most widespread rape myths is that the victim “asked for it.”136 This rape
myth shifts blame from the defendant to the victim.137 “[Rape] myths combine to
create a climate hostile to rape victims, a climate in which the victim is blamed for
the rape.”138 Defense attorneys are well aware of the prejudicial attitudes towards
rape. At trial, defense attorneys attempt to feed off of such attitudes.139 Judges
themselves tend to adopt a certain degree of partiality towards the defendant when
the alleged victim’s character or behavior is questionable.140 A judge’s attitude
towards parties is important because it is the judge who maintains control of the
courtroom and renders decisions as to the admissibility of evidence.141 In the end,
the standard of proof for “initial consent” rape is the same as that of all other crimes.
Prosecutors must prove the elements of rape beyond a reasonable doubt.142
Despite the existence of such procedural and societal safeguards, wrongful
convictions do occur, as is evident from the Gary Dotson case. The public invests
trust in prosecutors, judges, and jurors; however, prosecutors, judges, and jurors
cannot always be trusted.143 A 1987 study found that since the dawn of the twentieth
century, more than 350 people had been wrongfully convicted of crimes punishable
plea. Id.; see also Berliner, supra note 112, at 2687. Research indicates that prosecutors are
less likely to prosecute when the victim and the assailant are acquaintances than when the
victim and the assailant are strangers. Id.
134

In a criminal trial, the defendant has some discretion as to the fact-finder. ALLISON &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 179. Prior to the commencement of a trial, the defendant may
request that a judge determine the verdict. Id. Nonetheless, most rape trials are decided by a
jury. Id.
135

JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 94.

136

Id.; see also COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 43-45 (1995). In a 1977 survey conducted by Barnett and Field,
34 percent of the respondents agreed that “a woman should be responsible for preventing her
victimization in rape.” Id. at 44. In a 1988 survey conducted by Ward, 46 percent of the
respondents disagreed that “men, not women, are responsible for rape.” Id. In a 1991 survey
conducted by Holcomb, 22 percent of the respondents agreed that “any woman could prevent
rape if she really wanted to.” Id. at 45.
137

JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 94.

138

CONFRONTING, supra note 104, at 252.

139

A defense attorney once began a rape trial by attempting to insert a pencil into the
opening of a spinning Coke bottle. Id. at 39. The purpose of the demonstration was to
convince the jury that a woman could avoid an act of rape if so desired. Id. In effect, the
defense attorney was attributing blame to the victim.
140

See WARD, supra note 136, at 105-06.

141

Id. at 105.

142

Jeff Goldblatt, Illinois First State to Pass ‘No Means No’ Law (Aug. 20, 2003), at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,95277,00.html.
143

See LISA STOLZENBERG & STEWART J. D’ALESSIO, CRIMINAL COURTS
CENTURY 356 (1999).
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by death.144 Of those 350 people, 116 were sentenced to death.145 Of those 116
people, twenty-three were executed.146 In In re Winship, the Supreme Court of the
United States established the principle that it is better to let a guilty person go free
than to convict an innocent person. 147 “The greatest injustice that any society can
perpetrate is to convict, and possibly even put to death, an innocent person.”148
B. Problems with the Crime of “Initial Consent” Rape Within the Context
of the Illinois Statutory Code
1. Ambiguous Language
“Criminal law’s must obvious weak spot [in addressing the crime of rape] is its
vagueness.”149 Despite continuous efforts to reform rape law, standards for
determining the existence of rape remain uncertain.150 In a 1992 survey, 22 percent
of the female respondents reported that a man had forced them to engage in sexual
intercourse.151 In the same survey, 3 percent of the male respondents reported they
had forced a woman to engage in sexual intercourse.152 Researchers attributed the
discrepancy to a general misconception as to the legal definition of “force.”153
Vague statutory language is problematic in that it does not adequately inform
citizens of their rights. The potential defendant is unaware of the legal limits of his
actions. Likewise, the potential victim is unable to recognize when she has a valid
claim.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan wrote:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime where there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt. As was said in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525-26 (1958), “There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in
factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake
an interest of transcending value – as a criminal defendant his liberty – this margin of
error is reduced as to him by the process of placing the other party the burden of …
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt” beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 363-64.
148

STOLZENBERG & D’ALESSIO, supra note 143, at 356.

149

RAPE 144 (Mary E. Williams ed., 2001).

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 145.
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The Illinois statutory code fails to clearly define the crime of “initial consent”
rape. For instance, the code does not specify what constitutes a withdrawal of
consent.154 The code also does not specify the time period in which a sexual partner
has to cease sexual intercourse following a withdrawal of consent.155 Illinois
lawmakers have reserved such questions for the courts.
2. Absence of a Graduated Rape Law
a. Moral Concerns
Even more troubling, the Illinois statutory code fails to draw a distinction
between the behavior of an “initial consent” rapist and the behavior of a stranger
rapist.156 Illinois does not enforce a graduated rape law. Pursuant to the Illinois
statutory code, all first-time acts of rape not involving aggravating circumstances are
“Class 1” felonies.157 “Initial consent” rapists and stranger rapists are subject to the
same sentencing guidelines.
The prosecution of an “initial consent” rapist for the same offense as a stranger
rapist is morally inappropriate.158 “Initial consent” rapists are not as culpable as
stranger rapists. Concededly, the “initial consent” rapist, like the stranger rapist,
may intend to violate the victim. However, unlike the stranger rapist, the “initial
consent” rapist will formulate this intent during an excited sexual state.
Oftentimes, an act of “initial consent” rape will be the product of
miscommunication. Men possess a more sexualized view of the world than
women.159 As a result, men are sometimes insensitive to signals conveyed by
women.160 In an “initial consent” rape case, the victim will say “no” to sexual
intercourse while she is engaged in the act of sexual intercourse. By saying “no,” the
victim may feel that she is clearly expressing her desire to terminate sexual
intercourse. However, given the victim’s prior consent, the assailant is prone to
ignore the victim’s statement.161
Token resistance further complicates matters. Token resistance is a practice in
which a woman indicates that she does not want to engage in sexual intercourse even
though, in actuality, she does want to engage in sexual intercourse and is willing to
engage in sexual intercourse.162 Women tend to offer token resistance to sexual
154

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17.

155

See id.

156

See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13.

157

Id.

158

See MARK COWLING, DATE RAPE AND CONSENT 132 (1998).

159

See id. at 57.

160

See id. at 58.

161

See id. at 61. Kanin interviewed self-disclosed date rapists. Id. Each of the rapists
stated that the act of rape was preceded by some consensual sexual activity. Id. In 84 percent
of the cases, this consensual activity involved genital play. Id. The rapists stated that the
intimacies had gone so far that they did not take rejections seriously. Id.
162

ALLISON & WRIGHTMAN, supra note 64, at 78.
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intercourse. In a 1988 study, Muehlenhard and Hollabaugh asked 610 female
students at Texas A&M University if they ever said “no” to sexual intercourse when
they really meant “yes.”163 Thirty-nine percent of the students surveyed admitted to
offering such token resistance on at least one prior occasion.164
Women tend to engage in token resistance in large part because of societal and
cultural norms.165 Women are expected to say “no” to sexual intercourse regardless
of their true feelings.166 Consequently, men are reluctant to interpret the word “no”
as a denial or revocation of consent.167 In a 1987 study, Sandberg, Jackson, and
Petretic-Jackson asked college students to explain what their dating partners meant
when they said “no” to sexual activity.168 A majority of the male respondents
expressed their belief that the word “no” meant “yes.”169
In a study funded by the National Institute of Mental Health, researchers
conducted a survey of acquaintance-rape victims and stranger-rape victims.170 More
specifically, researchers questioned the victims as to their reactions during the actual
commission of the rape.171 Eleven percent of the acquaintance-rape victims reported
that they screamed for help during their assault.172 In contrast, 31 percent of the
stranger-rape victims reported that they screamed for help during their assault.173 In
comparison with the stranger-rape victims, twice as many stranger-rape victims
reported that they tried to flee their assailant.174 Identical proportions of both groups
reported that they offered resistance to their assailant. Seventy percent of the

163

Id. at 78-79.

164

Id. at 79. Of those women who admitted to engaging in the practice of token resistance,
32.5 percent reported doing it only once, 45.6 percent reported doing it two to five times, 11.2
percent reported doing it six to ten times, 7.8 percent reported doing it eleven to twenty times,
and 2.9 percent reported doing it more than twenty times. Id.
165

JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 22; see also RAPE, supra note 149, at 61.
From very early ages, men and women are conditioned to accept different roles.
Women are raised to be passive and men are raised to be aggressive. We are
conditioned to accept certain attitudes, values and behaviors. Our conditioning is
continuously and relentlessly encouraged and reinforced by the popular media,
cultural attitudes and the education system. . . . Social training about what is proper
and ladylike, as well as what is powerful and macho, teaches women to be victims and
men to be aggressors.

166

JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 22.

167

See id. 22-23.

168

Id. at 96.

169

Id.

170

RAPE, supra note 149, at 154.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Id.
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acquaintance-rape victims and 70 percent of the stranger-rape victims indicated that
they struggled with their assailant.175
Although identical proportions from the two groups reported offering resistance,
independent evidence suggests that the stranger-rape victims may have offered more
substantial resistance than the acquaintance-rape victims. Research has revealed a
curvilinear relationship between the amount of force applied by the assailant and the
degree of acquaintance between the victim and the assailant.176 A possible
explanation for the curvilinear relationship is that the stranger-rape victim offers
more resistance than the acquaintance-rape victim. Therefore, the assailant must
counter more resistance with more force.
In all likelihood, the “initial consent” rape victim will be less likely than the
acquaintance-rape victim to scream, run, and resist. The degree of acquaintance will
probably be greater between the “initial consent” rape victim and the assailant than
the typical acquaintance-rape victim and the assailant. After all, the relationship
between the “initial consent” rape victim and the assailant will have already
progressed to the level of some consensual sexual activity. In the absence of definite
signals of non-consent, the “initial consent” rapist may not perceive his act as an act
of force.
b. Practical Concerns
The absence of a graduated rape law also has practical implications.177 Without a
graduated rape law, a jury might be apt to engage in the practice of jury
nullification.178 Some rape laws mandate a maximum life sentence.179 A jury that
finds a defendant guilty of “initial consent” rape may nonetheless acquit because it
does not feel that the defendant’s actions warrant such a severe punishment.180
While an “initial consent” rapist might not be as culpable as a stranger rapist, he or
she should not go unpunished.
Criminal law is dominated by two theories of punishment: the utilitarian theory
and the retributive theory.181 Although the two theories employ different approaches
in determining the justification of punishment, the two theories can hardly be
considered opposites.182 The utilitarian theory justifies punishment whenever there is
175

Id.

176

Id. at 29. Koss, Dinero, Siebel, and Cox found that marital rapes involved the most
violence and that acquaintance rapes involved the least violence. Id. Stranger rape fell in
between the two. Id.
177

See COWLING, supra note 158, at 132.

178

The term “jury nullification” refers to “a jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the
evidence or refusal to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about
some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is
contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389
(2d pocket ed. 2001).
179

See COWLING, supra note 158, at 132.

180

See id.

181

JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 31 (2d ed. 1999).

182

A third theory of punishment, the mixed theory, is a combination of the utilitarian
theory and the retributivist theory. FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 63 (Leo Katz et al. eds.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

19

180

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:161

a net social gain.183 Under the utilitarian theory, if the benefit to society outweighs
the harm to the defendant and the defendant’s family, the punishment is justified.184
Social gains of punishment may include the following: general deterrence, specific
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.185
Generally, the “initial consent” rapist will be one of two types: the “initial
consent rapist who misinterprets the actions of his sexual partner or the “initial
consent” rapist who formulates intent during the heat of passion. In the case of the
“initial consent” rapist who has misinterpreted his sexual partner, punishment yields
only one social benefit, general deterrence. Without actual punishment, the threat of
punishment will lose its effect.186 Nevertheless, the benefit of general deterrence will
not suffice to offset the harm experienced by the defendant and the defendant’s
family.
In the case of the “initial consent” rapist who has formulated intent during the
heat of passion, punishment may yield several social benefits. For example, the
punishment may serve to notify other members of society of the potential
consequences of their actions. The punishment may serve to physically prevent the
individual from striking again. Along the same lines, the punishment may serve to
condition the individual so that he does not strike again. Undoubtedly, there will be
instances where there is a net social gain. However, this does not mean that the
“initial consent” rapist should be punished to the same extent as the stranger rapist.
Given the circumstances of the crime, the “initial consent” rapist will require less
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation than the stranger rapist.
The application of the retributive theory is more straightforward than the
application of the utilitarian theory. Individuals understand and utilize the retributive
theory to justify punishment on the grounds of just deserts.187 Retributivists live by
the oft-quoted phrase “an eye for an eye.” The retributive theory identifies a good in
punishment.188 However, this good does not take the form of social gain.189 “The
good that punishment achieves is that someone who deserves it gets it.”190
Under the retributive theory, the “initial consent” rapist who acts with intent
deserves to be punished. He has deprived the victim of her personal freedom.
Moreover, as will be discussed shortly, he has inflicted the victim with
psychological, and possibly physical, injury. Although the “initial consent” rapist
deserves to be punished, he does not deserve to be punished to the same extent as the
stranger rapist. As previously noted, the stranger rapist tends to act with more
1999) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]. According to the mixed theory, punishment is justified
whenever there is (1) a net social gain and (2) a defendant who deserves to be punished. Id.
In applying the mixed theory, desert acts as a limitation on punishment. Id.
183

Id.

184

Id.

185

DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 34-35.

186

Id. at 31.

187

Id.

188

FOUNDATIONS, supra note 182, at 62.

189

Id.

190

Id.
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violence than the acquaintance rapist.191 Furthermore, stranger rapes are often
premeditated. In an “initial consent” rape, intent, if it exists, is developed during a
heightened emotional state. Whether a juror resorts to a utilitarian line of reasoning
or a retributive line of reasoning, he or she will be hesitant to convict an “initial
consent” rapist when the mandated sentence is the same as that of the stranger rapist.
C. Effect of Rape on the Victim
The Justice Department estimates that one in seven women will be raped during
her lifetime.192 For that unlucky one in seven, the act of rape will crack, if not
completely shatter, the world around her. Rape has profound physical and
psychological effects on the victim.193 Generally, the rapist will apply some degree
of force to subdue the victim.194 Depending on the rapist, force may be the
motivating factor behind the act of rape itself.195 As a result, the victim may sustain
some physical injury during the act of rape.196 In some scenarios, the victim will
walk away from the assault physically unscathed.197 While some victims manage to
avoid physical injury during the act of rape, nearly all victims must deal with some
form of post-rape physical injury. Psychological injury tends to manifest itself
physically.198
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“[A]ll rape victims suffer from rape trauma syndrome to some degree.”199 Rape
trauma syndrome “describe[s] a predictable stress response pattern [that] a victim . . .
typically displays following an assault.”200 Rape trauma syndrome may be divided
into two phases, the acute crisis phase and the long-term reaction phase.201 The acute
crisis phase deals with the victim’s immediate reactions to the assault.202 This phase
can last anywhere from days to weeks to months.203 The emotions of anxiety and
fearfulness dominate this phase.204 The victim is prone to fall into a state of severe
depression.205 Multiple studies have found that at least three in ten sexual assault
victims consider suicide.206 During the acute crisis phase, the victim frequently
replays the act of rape in her mind.207 Fixation on the act of rape commonly prevents
the victim from falling asleep.208 When the victim finally does fall asleep, she
ordinarily has nightmares about the assault.209
The long-term reaction phase commences when the victim attempts to pick up
the pieces of her once structured world.210 A primary symptom of this stage is the
development of a phobia, “an irrational fear . . . [that] interferes with effective
adaptation to one’s environment.”211 For example, a victim who is raped in an unlit
environment might develop a fear of the dark. As a result, she might leave on the
lights in her home twenty-four hours a day.
During the long-term reaction phase, the victim commonly encounters difficulties
in restoring the facets of everyday life.212 The victim commonly has trouble
reestablishing a normal eating pattern.213 Some victims are unable to consume food
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on a regular basis.214 Other victims view food as a temporary solution to their
problems.215 Similarly, the victim commonly has trouble re-establishing a normal
sleeping pattern.216 For many victims, the nightmares experienced during the acute
crisis phase carry over into the long-term reaction phase. In severe cases, the
psychological consequences of rape cause insomnia.217 Perhaps the greatest hurdle
for the victim is the resumption of sexual activity. Rape victims often report a
diminished sex drive or arousal level.218 Due to this diminished sex drive or arousal
level, some victims find that they are unable to orgasm.219 For some victims, the
resumption of sexual activity triggers flashbacks to the assault.220 The duration of
the long-term reaction phase varies with the victim.221 Some victims will never fully
recover from their assault.222
In addition to rape trauma syndrome, 65 percent of rape victims suffer from posttraumatic stress syndrome.223 Post-traumatic stress syndrome is defined as “the
development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically distressing
event that is outside the range of usual human experience.”224 All persons suffering
from post-traumatic stress syndrome exhibit two symptoms.225 First, the person
becomes preoccupied with the traumatic event, reliving it over and over again in
their mind.226 Second, the person exhibits a reduced responsiveness to the
environment in which they function.227 In addition to the two aforementioned
symptoms, a person suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome must exhibit at
least two of the following symptoms: difficulty sleeping, irritability, difficulty
concentrating, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, and physiological
reactivity upon exposure to events related to the traumatic event.228 Of the six
secondary symptoms, studies indicate that rape victims most often experience
difficulty concentrating, hypervigilance, and physiological reactivity upon exposure
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to events related to the assault. Rape trauma syndrome and post-traumatic stress
syndrome overlap in several respects.229
IV. CONCLUSION
Nonconsensual sexual intercourse has destructive effects on an individual’s
physical and mental health. Given the prevalence of nonconsensual sexual
intercourse, destruction to the individual translates into destruction to society. State
lawmakers should take an active approach towards deterring individuals from
committing acts of forced sexual intercourse. However, this is not to say that state
lawmakers should sacrifice basis tenets of American legal jurisprudence in pursuing
these ends. The enactment of laws recognizing the crime of “initial consent” rape
could very well help curb the destructive effects of forced sexual intercourse. This is
not at issue. What is at issue is the attitude of such laws towards the defendant.
Laws recognizing the crime of “initial consent” rape should not function to stack the
deck, so to speak, against the defendant. As Matthew Hale, a British jurist, once
proclaimed, “rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and
impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered that it is an
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to be defended by the
party accused, though ever so innocent.”230
This note does not support the proposition that states should refuse to recognize
the crime of “initial consent” rape. Statutory recognition of the right to revoke
consent during sexual intercourse is justifiable on several grounds. As previously
noted, nonconsensual sexual intercourse is damaging to both the victim and society.
From a retributive perspective, forced sexual intercourse warrants punishment. From
a utilitarian perspective, punishing the offender promotes the well being of society.
In a society that strives for equality, laws restricting the right to revoke consent after
penetration are dominantly male oriented.231 Such laws “reinforce the idea that,
beyond a certain point in a sexual encounter, men are powerless to stop.”232 As a
result, such laws deprive women of sexual freedom.233 Furthermore, the right to
revoke consent is a fixture in American legal jurisprudence. For example, the law of
torts recognizes the right of the property owner to revoke consent as to entrance onto
his or her property.234 In the event of a revocation of consent to enter onto property,
the licensee or the invitee must make a conscious effort to exit the property. If no
such effort is made, he or she will be held liable for trespass.235 One could easily
make a more compelling argument for the right to revoke entrance into one’s body
than for the right to revoke entrance into one’s home.236
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This note does support the proposition that states should refuse to recognize the
crime of “initial consent” rape in a manner consistent with the Illinois’ statutory
code. As it stands, Illinois’ amended rape law is plagued with problems. At the
heart of these problems are problems concerning the defendant’s rights. Illinois’
amended rape law fails to afford adequate protection to the defendant. The problem
of inadequate protection is a byproduct of both the nature of “initial consent” rape
and the statutory language in which the crime is framed.
An inherent problem of the crime of “initial consent” rape is that of limited
evidence. Given the nature of “initial consent” rape, prosecutors will have a difficult
time amassing evidence of the crime. As a result, prosecutors will be inclined to
focus on issues of credibility. For the defendant who finds himself in the midst of a
credibility contest, rape shield laws serve as a serious handicap. Rape shield laws
restrict the defendant from introducing evidence as to the alleged victim’s sexual
history. Unable to refer to the alleged victim’s sexual past, the defendant will have a
more difficult time establishing that there was no revocation of consent.
The problem of limited evidence underlies two other inherent problems, false
accusations and wrongful convictions. The unfounded rate of rape already exceeds
that of any other Crime Index crime.237 Inherent limitations on evidence act only to
encourage false accusations. Prosecutors and judges will expect less from the
alleged victim in terms of evidence. Prosecutors and judges will also have a difficult
time identifying fictitious claims. The prevalence of false accusations coupled with
the “he said, she said” nature of “initial consent” rape cases creates an environment
ripe for wrongful conviction. Admittedly, the standard of proof remains that of
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, it must be recognized that a jury of
laypersons must apply this standard. Although some jurors may harbor prejudicial
attitudes toward alleged victims, it cannot be said that all will.
A lawmaker’s hands are tied in dealing with the problem of limited evidence.
Lawmakers, like everyone else, must await the development of improved methods of
collecting and preserving evidence of rape. While lawmakers are handcuffed in
dealing with the problem of limited evidence, they can erect safeguards against false
accusations and wrongful convictions. For example, lawmakers can impose more
stringent sanctions on persons who make false accusations of “initial consent” rape.
Likewise, lawmakers can relax the enforcement of rape shield laws in “initial
consent” rape cases. The relaxation of rape shield laws would accomplish two
objectives. First, it would deter persons from making false accusations. Presumably,
a person would think twice about filing a false report if their public history was
subject to public disclosure. Second, it would give the innocent defendant much
needed ammunition in credibility contests. Lawmakers can also reinstate the
physical resistance element in “initial consent” rape cases. The reinstatement of the
physical resistance would accomplish three objectives. First, it would make it
difficult to prosecute frivolous claims. Second, it would ensure that that the
defendant received adequate notice of the victim’s revocation of consent. Third, it
would provide the fact-finder with an objective measure of consent, thus limiting
possibilities of error.
Lawmakers are better equipped to deal with statutory problems than with
inherent problems. In dealing with statutory problems, lawmakers need only
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restructure the statutory language. Illinois’ amended rape law suffers from the
problem of ambiguity. The Illinois statutory code does not define what constitutes a
revocation of consent. Furthermore, the Illinois statutory code fails to indicate the
time period in which an individual has to cease sexual intercourse following a
revocation of consent. As a result, members of the public are not fully informed of
their rights. Ignorance as to one’s rights can, and often does, lead to the commission
of crime. Illinois’ lawmakers can solve the problem of ambiguity by passing bills
containing the requisite information.
Illinois’ rape law is also problematic in that it does not subdivide the crime of
rape into varying offenses. In the absence of a graduated rape law, statutory
recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape generates both moral and practical
concerns. Illinois’ lawmakers can put these concerns to rest by amending the rape
law so as to recognize different rape offenses with different sentencing guidelines.
In such a system, lesser offenses can be reserved for those rape crimes in which
consent is dubious. Such rape crimes include date rape, “initial consent” rape, and
marital rape. A graduated rape law like the one described would protect the
defendant who misinterprets signals or the defendant who gets caught up in the
moment from excessive punishment. A graduated rape law like the one described
would also protect society against jury nullification.
Through the enactment of Senate Bill 406, Illinois became the first state to
formally recognize the crime of “initial consent” rape. Inevitably, other states will
consider following suit. Lawmakers would be well-advised to approach the crime of
“initial consent” rape with caution. As is evident from an analysis of Illinois’
amended rape law, statutory recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape can
have dangerous ramifications.
BRETT M. KYKER
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